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Enunciating Genocide: Crime, Rights and 
the Impact of Judicial Intervention1 
 
 
Abstract 
As a consequence of recent decisions from the ICJ and the ICTR it is clear that genocide can be pursued 
through the international courts both in terms of criminal liability and also rights/responsibility legal 
paradigms.  This paper suggests that this duality in possible contexts and processes of judicial 
determination, while being procedurally problematic, is in keeping with the human rights direction of 
international criminal justice.  In addition, by opening the legal consideration of genocide to questions of 
individual liability as well as state-sponsored rights abuse, judges are now able to consider the more 
realistic complexity of genocide atrocity and thereby to address the diverse legitimate interests of 
victims. Particularly, by enabling and expanding juridical activation as the medium for legally enunciating 
the genocide convention, the determination of genocide and its consequences may benefit from 
enhanced certainty when reflected against the constitutional legality of the courts, the elaboration of 
judicial narrative and the accretion of argued and judicially deliberated jurisprudence in criminal and 
human rights jurisdictions. 
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Introduction 
The interplay between state-to-state suits for genocide, and the criminal prosecution of genocide are 
important developments in both international criminal justice, and international humanitarian law. The 
fact that the International Court of Justice has ruled that genocide may be alleged as a delict against a 
state by another state before this court opens up a consideration of the role judges can play in 
enunciating the spirit and the process of the genocide convention. With Rome Statute claiming for the 
international Criminal Court jurisdiction to try individuals charged with genocide, and the ad hoc 
tribunals deliberating on such charges, complemented by domestic criminal prosecutions of the crime, 
then the nature and scope of judicial engagement with genocide is both particularized.  In addition, the 
rights and liability approaches now available in bringing genocide to judicial determination offer a more 
holistic consideration of the atrocity, its perpetration and its consequences, through considerations of 
individual criminal liability, and collective state responsibility for the abuse of rights which genocide 
declares. 
Now, insofar as international judicial determinations are concerned, legal reaction to genocide can be 
pursued through international criminal law (vested in domestic courts, the ad hoc UN tribunals, and the 
ICC) or through human rights law (before global rights courts such as the ICJ). This paper will attempt to 
understand the consequences of these parallel developments both for the execution of the genocide 
convention and for the development of a richer judicial engagement with this horror. Some of the 
aspects of, and the differences between, both approaches require analysis against the aims of criminal 
justice and their possible attainment (Findlay & Henham, 2010). The paper concludes that an important 
alliance between international criminal law and international rights law is developing for the 
enunciation of genocide, which is leading to an enhanced role for judicial determination in the global 
response of the global community.  The interesting purpose for the paper is to discuss the duality in 
possible routes to and contexts of judicial determination, against the aspirations particularly for 
legitimate victim interests which either style of justice (criminal or rights-based) may offer ( Findlay 
2011b)).  The empirical dimension of this analysis might eventually be to test whether the wider goals of 
international criminal justice (with their origins in criminal liability, rights protection, and security and 
peace-making) are better met through the addition of a human rights judicial paradigm. Do human 
rights considerations ‘add value’ to the emerging reach of international criminal justice over genocide 
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via recognition of the need to look at states’ responsibility for rights protection along with individual 
liability for crimes of genocide? What are some of the problems/limits faced in this duality? 
International Criminal Justice – Rights responsibility and criminal liability in tandem? 
Some commentators argue that the justice core of international criminal justice is now best explained in 
terms of: 
 the imminent rise of human rights sanctioned by international criminal tribunals as the 
emerging paradigm of international relations and law (Megret, 2002, p.1266).  
Directly following the experiences of World War II, there was a new and fresh commitment to 
formalizing basic human rights principles at an international level.  The Genocide Convention (UN, 1948) 
and the Universal Declaration on Human Rights (General Assembly, 1948) were both adopted in 1948 by 
the United Nations General Assembly in a climate of renewed humanitarianism and peace keeping. The 
update and expansion of the Geneva Conventions in 1949 show how international laws had a significant 
influence on the development of international humanitarian law. The Geneva Conventions, especially 
through the rights protections of prisoners and those directly affected by military conflict, have had a 
rich influence over the development of a wider, non-military human rights framework internationally.  
Further, the creation of post World War II crimes tribunals represents the earliest attempts to direct the 
remit of international humanitarian law towards individual rather than state interests, by incorporating 
rights violation within criminalization and picking up their consequences in criminal sanctioning. 
Behaviours that offend the human rights of individuals were criminalized, and as mentioned before, for 
the first time individuals were prosecuted for international crimes. In this sense, the international 
criminal tribunals, in particular the International Criminal Court (ICC), can be seen as the institutional 
culmination of the belief that because individuals live under the international legal system that must 
necessarily have rights and obligations flowing from it, generating a clear connection between 
international criminal justice and human rights.  
The emerging body of criminal procedure now adopted in international criminal courts also displays the 
influence of human rights, not just through the conventional due process protections favouring accused 
persons, but also by recognising legitimate victim engagement (Amann, 2000). However, as with 
international human rights legislation or institutions, there are complex challenges to enforcing 
international criminal justice rights in many situations of conflict and resistance, genocide not being the 
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least of these. Even so, the recognition that international criminal justice rights and procedures should 
complement judicial human rights protection has meant that the global governance influence of rights 
and justice can more centrally guide the global community’s response to humanitarian challenges such 
as genocide (Findlay, 2008). The analysis to follow will unpack both approaches while at the same time 
arguing that their parallel and intersecting development through judicial determination offers: 
 Greater certainty and actionability for the genocide convention, and more broadly 
 A measure of whether the wider aims for international criminal justice (such as the protection of 
victims from genocide) are advanced through judicial determinations directed against criminal 
liability and human rights responsibility, individual or state-centred. 
The Reach of Criminal Liability 
Zahar and Sluiter (2008) refer to the codification of genocide as a crime under the Genocide Convention 
of 1948, in terms of a ‘rare gift to international criminal law where the nascent UN tribunals generally 
have to struggle to give shape to ill-defined crimes’ (Zahar & Sluiter, 2008, p.156). The key elements of 
genocide’s codification were added, unchanged, to the statutes of the International Criminal Court (ICC), 
the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), the International Criminal Tribunal 
for Rwanda (ICTR), and the Special Panels for East Timor (Article 4 of the ICTY Statute, Article 2 of the ICTR 
Statute and Article 6 of the Rome Statute creating the International Criminal Court). As one of only four crimes 
over which the ICC has jurisdiction genocide is centrally located within the limited offence framework of 
international criminal laws.   
Many nation states which have ratified the Genocide Convention now implement the offence within 
their domestic legislation. It is through the national courts as yet that genocide has been most actively 
criminalised. 
In 1996, as a consequence of its majority decision in the Case concerning Application of the Convention 
on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Yugoslavia) - 
Judgment on preliminary objections; the International Court of Justice (ICJ) found that it had jurisdiction 
to deal with the case on the basis of Article IX of the Convention, dismissing the additional the remaining 
non-genocide related bases of jurisdiction invoked by Bosnia-Herzegovina.  This decision cleared the 
way for actions to be brought state against state concerning allegations of genocide as serious violations 
of international humanitarian law. In its much criticized decision in 2007 on the case The Application of 
the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. 
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Serbia and Montenegro), case 91, (after here referred to as the ICJ genocide judgment) the ICJ held - 
although not unanimously - that Serbia was neither directly responsible for the Srebrenica genocide 
(earlier determined as such by the ICTY and with which the ICJ agreed), nor that Serbia was complicit in 
it. However, the court did rule that Serbia had breached the Genocide Convention by failing to prevent 
the Srebrenica genocide, for not cooperating with the ICTY in punishing the perpetrators of the 
genocide, in particular in respect of General Ratko Mladid, and for violating its obligation to comply with 
the provisional measures ordered by the Court. In this respect the UN’s principal human rights tribunal 
accorded with the UN’s criminal tribunal on the Balkans conflict in confirming genocide as appropriate 
for judicial determination both in terms of criminal and international human rights jurisdictions. 
After recognizing the development of a dual judicial capacity to deliberate on genocide charges, this 
brief paper analyses how understanding and responding to genocide as a crime and genocide as a 
violation of human rights now:  
 Can be enhanced by a dualist juridical activation at the international level in order to enjoy the 
force of law in both criminal and human rights paradigms; and  
 how by taking the global consideration of genocide beyond the enunciation of commissions and 
conventions and locating it centrally within a judicial remit, the determination of genocide and 
its consequences now has a far greater potential for certainty and actionability through:  
o reflection against the constitutional legality of the courts,  
o distillation within the elaboration of judicial narrative and  
o elaboration through the accretion of argued and judicially deliberated jurisprudence in 
criminal and human rights jurisdictions.  
Regarding this combined judicial consideration of genocide through the lenses of human rights and 
criminal liability Judge Peter Touma of the ICJ observed: 
Hopefully, the activities of these two judicial institutions of the United Nations [The 
International Court of Justice and the International Tribunal for the former 
Yugoslavia]…contribute in their respective fields to their common objective – the achievement 
of international justice – however imperfect it may be perceived (as quoted in Groome, 2007, 
p.911). 
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Yet, in seeking to have the crime of genocide, and the human rights violations it represents adjudicated 
through international courts, is too much being asked of judges to perform this cross over?  Particularly 
with respect to the International Court of Justice, is it appropriate to require that court to determine the 
responsibility of states by employing a similar methodology which interrogates the minds and actions of 
senior state figures, in appreciating the way a criminal court would approach liability? Does this 
collapsing of rights and crime determinations risk that judicial decision-making may lose some of its 
definition and rigor?  I argue it does not.  The reason for this confidence is that as a consequence of the 
manner in which the international criminal tribunals and courts have received their mandates, 
international criminal justice has a clear human rights dimension and this is an important distinguishing 
characteristic of the development of international trial justice compared with national systems. For 
instance, referring to Article 5 of the Rome Statute, genocide (defined in Art 6), crimes against humanity 
(defined in Art 7), war crimes (defined in Art 8), and crimes of aggression (defined in Art 8) are deemed 
crimes which fall within the jurisdiction of the ICC.  Against these crimes the Rome Statute invokes aims 
directed towards peace and security which are as much about rights protection as punishment and 
retribution. 
The State Parties to the Rome Statute (through its Preamble) recognise that crimes against humanity 
threaten the peace, security and well-being of the world, and in doing so within the wording of the Rome 
Statute, the ICC is declared to be committed to ameliorating such ends. For the ICC, the maintenance of 
international peace and security asks more than what the retributive justice model can supply – that is 
the punishment of the guilty – it looks at the impact of the crime far more comprehensively and engages 
with the consequences for victims as well as the responsibility of perpetrators. Adjudicating liability 
becomes a vehicle for responding to what has personally impacted the victim, and the court’s 
determination of the crime needs to be mindful of the conditions for peace and security that must 
reflect these considerations (Findlay 2011 b)). 
Peace and security in the context of the ICC includes the prevention of conflict-related risks to the lives 
of potential victims. Where crimes that threaten international peace and security are committed (that 
fall within the jurisdiction of the ICC), a referral should be made to empower the ICC to facilitate 
international accountability by restoring peace and security for the victims of such conflicts. Peace and 
security as concerns for ICC process, look beyond the perpetrators of global crime, focusing the Court’s 
attention principally on the victims of such crime. The objective of ensuring peace and security seeks to 
prevent harm to potential victims both now and in future, and hopes to repair and restore the damage 
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done to those who are already victims of global crimes within the Court’s jurisdiction. Peace sees the 
broken community moving beyond the tensions that brought about the particular conflict and providing 
protection for present risk, and security looks past the frictions that might ensue from current conflict 
towards a peaceful future for victims and their communities. 
If we take from the wider aims of the ICC as expressing legitimate aims for international criminal justice, 
and that these aims reflect rights protection as well as punishment and retribution then in addressing 
the crime of genocide it is only natural that the two justice paradigms should be operational for a more 
comprehensive realization of global justice. This being so we can seek within international criminal 
justice, judicial determinations the duality of rights and retribution, while at the same time seeing that 
duality as available through the consideration of the global rights judiciary as well as the judges in the 
international criminal courts and tribunals. 
Adjudicating responsibility and liability 
For the purposes of this paper I will consider the judicial role in ruling on genocide internationally as 
now taking two forms –  
 the determination of individual criminal responsibility through the international criminal courts 
and tribunals; and 
 determining the human rights responsibilities of state parties in conflict by the ICJ. 
This distinction is not meant to minimise the capacity of judges within all levels of international criminal 
justice to consider both dimensions of genocide (rights and crime). Rather it is intended to ad to that 
capacity by providing an additional jurisdictional avenue for opening up the process of judicial 
determination, and directing it to individuals and to states. 
As suggested above, while the methodologies employed in judicial interpretations for both decision 
processes may invite similar considerations, the outcomes are distinctly different and the enforcement 
consequences represent separate motivations. Liability is directed to the criminal actions of the 
individual.  I have in other writing criticised the artificiality of such determinations when global crimes 
are so often perpetuated in collective enterprises or demonstrate the intentions and aggregations of 
many minds (Findlay, 2011a). To address this to some extent beyond the individual, responsibility is 
accorder by the ICJ to state parties and while it is the behaviours and thinking of state officials which is 
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taken to evidence state responsibility, the judicial determination concerns the role of states as rights 
violators.   
The possibility of approaching genocide from both directions of individual and collective action offers a 
more realistic and satisfying consideration of such encompassing atrocity. In addition, looking at liability 
and responsibility broadens the extent to which individuals and states can be drawn into law’s 
regulatory net (Findlay, 2011a). 
Also, in an earlier work I argue that the legitimate interests of victims cannot be satisfied by either only 
liability or responsibility determinations (Findlay, 2011b). Criminal liability and ensuing punishment 
generates retributive understandings and may comfort victims and future victims through promises to 
end impunity, and the suggested safety that general deterrence may project.  To evoke all the 
restorative aspirations such as restitution, reparation and recognition which victims are seeking in 
addition to criminal punishment there is a need for the wider interrogation of victimisation that may not 
be offered by the selective discourse of adversarial testimony and questioning (for a discussion of the 
limited testimonial fabric of the international criminal trial see Findlay & Ngare, forthcoming). Consideration of 
human rights violations particularly by states offers a richer opportunity than would trial narrative 
focused on liability, to appreciate the complexity of global victimisation.  In addition, the anticipated 
outcomes of a responsibility rather than liability determination are more likely to address restorative 
and conflict resolution necessities, particularly if offending states accept their duties (or are shamed into 
accepting them) following on from responsibility allocation for mass rights violations. 
Another conflation of the liability/responsibility duality to consider when looking at the practical benefit 
of the two potential judicial determination approaches in tandem, is through the processes of proof. The 
definitional element that most distinguishes genocide from other international crimes is its mental state 
requirement that the perpetrator have the “intent to destroy in whole or in part a national, ethnical, 
racial or religious group, as such,”( Genocide Convention, Article 2) commonly referred to as the special 
intent of genocide. Although the term genocide is popularly used to describe many serious crimes 
committed on a discriminatory basis, its legal definition limits its prohibition to specified acts committed 
with the intent to destroy a particular protected group. This requirement, that a specified actor has a 
specific intent means that genocide cannot exist in the abstract, absent a clear demonstration that its 
perpetrators possess the intentional mental state of genocide.  
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The judicial determination of intent is important both for the proof of genocide as a crime and as a 
rights violation.  That said, the process of judicial determination in either situation evidences the 
different purposes for which judges in rights or criminal tribunals employ fundamental considerations of 
fact on which to base decisions on liability or responsibility. 
Genocidal Intent – relationship with liability and responsibility 
While the criminal conduct of genocide may seem to mirror that which also satisfies crimes against 
humanity, and such was the conventional determination as far back as the Nuremburg tribunal hearings 
(Cassese, 2002), the need for proof of intention is the distinguishing evidentiary element for proving 
genocide crimes, and a reason why criminal prosecution may be more difficult than the determination 
of responsibility for rights violation. Another complicating feature in a reliance on prosecuting liability as 
a satisfactory legal mechanism for addressing genocide is the uniquely collective nature of the atrocity. 
Generally speaking, genocide…is intended …to signify a coordinated plan of different actions 
aiming at the destruction of essential foundations of the life of national groups, with the aim of 
annihilating the groups themselves. The objectives of such a plan would be disintegration of the 
political and social institutions, of culture, language, national feelings, religion, and the 
economic existence of national groups, and the destruction of the personal security, liberty, 
health, dignity, and even lives of the individuals belonging to such groups (Lemkin, 1944, p.79). 
The collective dimension of genocide is an evidentiary factor in the more factually amenable 
determination of responsibility for rights violation where a senior state official takes action to manifest a 
largely shared genocidal intent and directs the criminal conduct which is perpetrated through many 
hands. The exploitation of misplaced nationalism or misunderstood necessities for defence may not be 
enough to satisfy the special intention required of individual genocidal liability, while it provides more 
than enough evidence of responsibility for mass rights violation. 
The corporate state entity possesses no capacity to formulate intent itself – its intent is revealed only 
through the demonstrable intentions of state actors with the de jure or de facto authority to engage the 
state’s participation in the criminal conduct. The ICJ in holding that states could be responsible for 
genocide developed a two-part test for determining whether the genocidal acts could be attributed to 
states in question, and thus determined where the court would look for genocidal intent. The first of 
these tests determines “whether acts of genocide…were perpetrated by ‘persons or entities’ having the 
status of organs of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia …under its internal law” ( ICJ Genocide Judgment 
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p.386). Using this test, the court examined the internal law of the respondent to determine if any person 
or entity engaged in genocidal acts had a legal relationship to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. In the 
absence of a direct legal relationship, the Court examined whether acts of genocide were perpetrated 
by persons or entities under the ‘effective control’ of the State as that term was defined in the 
Nicaragua v. United States case (1986).   
Having established this proof pathway for attributing state responsibility through the mind of senior 
officials the ICJ had to encounter similar proof questions which exercised the ICTY judges when 
deliberating genocide prosecutions such as in the Milosevic case.  Such a matter of proof, at least in the 
realm of evidentiary rules, suggests a decision-making situation where the judicial tasks of determining 
either responsibility or liability intersect, even though the material brought to bear in order that these 
proof requirements are satisfied may take distinctly different forms (individual or constructive intent). In 
addition to the foundations of proof differing, for the lawyers and their arguments in either fora, the 
burden and standard of proof may take on different requirements.  Such divergence is further 
confirmation that criminal liability determination and rights violation responsibilising are distinct but 
equally significant judicial determinations of genocide. The processes for making such determinations 
also reveal flexibility in constructing the perpetration of genocide from the individual mind of a single 
perpetrator to the imputed collective motivations of states. 
Different deliberative pathways of judicial determination can be a product of distinguishable purposes 
for judicial decision-making.  On the other-hand, an over emphasis on the differences between liability 
and responsibility determinations can unnecessarily distract analysis away from the central concerns for 
judicial determination, rights or crime based.  Returning to a consideration of the aims of international 
criminal justice, despite in its formal incarnation, the focus on criminal liability within the international 
criminal trial, there is little doubts that the intention of even retributive justice for global crime cannot 
be separated from concern for the rights of victims. It is through the rights focus of international 
criminal justice that much of its influence over global governance rests (Findlay 2008). 
Criminal Justice and Rights Consciousness - Rights and governance 
It is arguable that the foundations of international criminal justice in their current form can be traced 
back as a natural consequence of the development of international humanitarian law. In this respect 
international criminal justice institutions and processes may be seen as the result of: 
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 the logical development from victor’s justice and the war crimes tribunals following World War 
II; 
 a reaction to international atrocities; 
 evidence of a growing potency of international organizations and NGO’s in making rights a 
global governance issue; and 
 the product of new the place of humanitarian rights in international relations. 
The human rights focus of international criminal justice is essential for its global governance potential 
(Akhavan 2001). From domestic to global governance, international humanitarian law recognises the 
need to make nations states responsible for mass rights violations such as genocide as a measure of 
their civilised governance record. Global governance particularly through an institutional UN model can 
be seen as essentially informed by a human rights consciousness. The institutions created by this 
governance mechanism (such as rights courts and criminal tribunals), should reflect such a 
consciousness.  Because the influence of international criminal justice institutions on global governance 
is disproportionately significant (Findlay, 2008), the courts and tribunals of international criminal justice 
have a magnified rights-protection responsibility.  
To be confident that it is appropriate more than expedient to move judicial decision-making over 
genocide from questions of individual criminal liability to considerations of rights violation by states and 
in so doing produce a more convincing global justice account it is useful to overview how a rights 
consciousness has directed the development of the most recent phase of international criminal justice.  
With this understanding, it is possible to consider judges in global human rights courts and criminal 
tribunals advancing with a common mission of global justice as it applies to genocide, and thereby 
directly influencing the peace and security mission of global governance.  
It is not only for international criminal justice institutions to respect human rights in their procedures, 
but much more through their wider conflict resolution and victim interest aims, to see the rights of 
victims and their communities, and potential victim communities, at the forefront of the international 
criminal justice mission. However, critics of a tribunal-based approach to international criminal justice 
suggest that the true peacekeeping potential of international criminal justice and global governance is 
achieved more through the collective recognition of human rights (offered through international human 
rights conventions and their monitoring) than through the prosecution of violations against these 
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(Drumble 2009). If this position has merit then the claim by the ICJ for jurisdiction over the rights 
violations of state genocide is a welcome complement to the rights and governance potential of 
international criminal justice. The ICJ in its declaratory role, provides a measure of civilised governance 
through its capacity to declare states responsible, while not requiring findings of liability or 
determinations of punishment, so criticised by those who wish to see a more transitional role for 
international criminal justice. 
In the wider sense of international relations, rights recognition and protection come as a package with 
the delivery of humanitarian aid or with the establishment of trade relations or with establishment of 
new states configurations (Crossette, 2004; Warners, 2009; Fanthorpe 2003). This rights agenda around 
political economy, even at a normative level, confirms at a normative level at least a human rights epoch 
in the current state of global governance.  It would be wrong, however, to conceive this development as 
uniform, universal and non-problematic. It would also be an overstatement to assume that human rights 
recognition and protection are the only motivation behind international criminal justice, despite its 
wider peace-making aims. 
Motivations of international criminal justice 
As mentioned earlier in this paper, arguably, the prevailing motivation for the international jurisdiction 
of criminal justice as expressed in instruments such as the Rome Statute is a humanitarian rights 
response to the violation of individual rights posed by genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity 
and crimes of aggression. Along with the end to impunity, which the ICC claims will be a consequence of 
the selective prosecution and punishment of these crimes, the Preamble to the Statute indicates that 
the focus of the court’s justice aims is primarily ensuring peace and security for victims and potential 
victims.   
International criminal justice provides justice for victims in that it offers access to justice, inclusivity 
within the justice process and integration within justice communities (Greco, 2007). Yet, there is limited 
selective evidence of a genuine victim constituency developing for international criminal justice, one 
where humanitarian obligations can translate into the satisfaction of legitimate interests ( Findlay, 2007, 
2009). Translating justice for victims into identifiable trial outcomes is problematic, even in the language 
preferred by the ICC (perpetrator accountability, creating a historical record, deterring future crime, 
restoring peace). Even if there is some merit in concluding any of these outcomes from the selective 
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prosecution and punishment of token offenders before the ICC, the rights protection impact of such 
outcomes is far from certain. 
Making perpetrators accountable  
International criminal justice intends to establish accountability for individual perpetrators and thereby 
to end the impunity of those who would otherwise evade justice for massive global crimes. Recently the 
then Chief Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court directed this humanitarian aim against the late 
Libyan dictator Colonel Gaddafi in an early stage of the recent uprising against the Gaddafi regime ICC, 
2011). The prosecutor’s intention was to suggest that the actions of individual heads of state and the 
military figures who served the regime would not be outside the concern of international criminal justice 
at any stage of their development, and even prior to formal indictments (Cadman, 2012). While the 
allegations against Gaddafi did not focus on genocide, the Prosecutor’s rhetoric referred to crimes 
against countless victims of the regime, and the need to protect the rights of citizens against such 
individual and collective terror. 
Controversial as it’s manifestation in that case might be, the aim of making perpetrator’s accountable 
(also prominent in the prosecutorial discourse also directed against Charles Taylor) (Waugh, 2012) 
however, relies on externalities beyond the control of the court (such as violent military incursion or 
individual amnesty) in order to entice potential offenders to participate in the justice process where 
they would otherwise be immune from it through political or commercial protection and segregation. 
Amnesty is liberally applied in the less formal justice processes such as Truth and Reconciliation 
Commissions (TRC’s) to induce cooperation, and even the international criminal courts and tribunals 
offer such protections to key witnesses and informants despite the potential criticism of compromising 
objective justice in so doing.  
The formal international criminal justice style of selective intervention (selective prosecution in 
particular, which is a critical feature of international criminal trials) raises questions as to how 
impartiality in the delivery of justice is possible for international criminal trials. This reservation 
concerning the political partiality of international criminal justice gains added weight, given the 
sectarian determination of offenders and victims in situations where crisis is contested across geo-
political favouritism in international relations. Thus, for example, it was suggested in relation to the first 
case before the International Criminal Court that the government in the Democratic Republic of Congo 
(DRC) offered up the accused from an opposition militia in order protect themselves and their 
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operatives from prosecution. The Ituri area of the DRC conflict that was targeted for investigation by the 
ICC in its first trial, was the most distant from the political centre and much riven with opposition 
influence and authority. In this area evidence was also less clear as to whether the President and his 
supporters had any connection to the atrocities alleged to have been committed, whereas there was 
some evidence of his involvement in supporting militia groups associated with serious crimes in other 
areas and regions. Thus, with the ICC focusing on crimes in Ituri its activities could be politically 
acceptable to the central authorities by ‘displaying the least capacity to destabilise the current 
government’ (Clark, 2008, p.40). Further, the individuals selected for prosecution - Lubanga, Katanga 
and Ngudjolo - ‘represent the ICC’s attempts to maintain good working relations with the Congolese 
government in order to facilitate ICC investigations during ongoing conflict and to maintain the support 
of the Court’s principal donors in the context of the Congolese elections and their direct aftermath’ 
(Clark, 2008, p. 41-42). 
Selective application and activation are not criticisms reserved for international criminal justice alone.  
International human rights law is equally vulnerable to being selectively directed on political rather than 
merit-based grounds. Add to the feature of partiality, the restriction on engaging human rights law with 
non-state actors, and the rights paradigm may not cure the problem of selective benefit, whether one 
seeks judicial determination in a criminal liability or a rights protection route. 
Historical record  
The development of the historical record through international criminal justice is considered, 
particularly by victims, as an important humanitarian consequence of global justice intervention. For 
genocide, the treatment of any such record as atrocious against the standards of civilised society is 
critical for victims to claim the restitution and healing they deserve from genocide deniers and sceptics. 
In addition, records outside the courtroom such as commemorative monuments have been shown to 
facilitate victim and community participation and healing (Megret, 2010). Again, however, questions can 
be raised as to whose truth is being recorded in situations where stories are deeply contested and 
alternate versions of history are up for grabs (Findlay, 2009). For example, the decision of the ICTR in the 
Akayesu case represented the first time that an accused was convicted of genocide for crimes which 
explicitly included sexual violence, evidenced as rape in war (Akayesu Case, 1998). Despite what is now 
known of the systematic use of sexualized violence in the Rwandan conflict, charges of sexual violence 
were not initially included in the indictments, because of the as yet undetermined status of rape in war 
as evidence of any of the crimes within the tribunal’s jurisdiction (Booth, 2003). The Prosecutor at the 
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time felt that prosecution would not succeed on these grounds because of a belief that women victims 
would not wish to testify. However, Judge Pillay, who presided in the Akayesu case, investigated sexual 
assault evidence with two female witnesses called to testify to other crimes. The Judges expressed 
extreme dismay that witnesses were not asked about this earlier, and the Prosecutor subsequently 
amended the indictments to include further charges of sexual violence (Steains, 1999). Following on 
from this, the rape victims were accorded by the judges, unique freedom to describe the facts of their 
violation without relying as would normally be the case on the questioning of the lawyers from both 
sides. Is this case and the manner in which evidence of gross sexual violation evolved, more disturbingly 
recognition that adversarial examination of oral testimony in a court-room scenario where the rules of 
evidence limit telling the whole story, and indictments ignore large components of that story, means 
that the trial so conceived will never be the appropriate arena for historical record in the fullest sense? 
It could be said from the limits of the adversarial trial frame that an intimate and dynamic recognition of 
rights violation is a hostage to legal form.  Even so, witnesses receive a range of protections through this 
form and these also are not to be minimised when rights are evaluated.  One of the reasons we have 
argued so strongly for trial transformation in international criminal justice is to spread the due process 
net wider than what is available for vulnerable victim witnesses who testify to atrocity where and when 
they remain exposed to their perpetrators (Findlay & Henham, 2010). 
Deterrence  
The rights dimension of international criminal justice is directed towards what can be referred to as 
general deterrence against the perpetration of atrocities elsewhere, through the punishment of 
offenders and thereby the denial of impunity for them and those in the future. This protective 
consequence of justice relies on the assumption that potential offenders will be discouraged from 
activities which would otherwise constitute global crimes by the prosecution of those who have 
committed such offenses in other places. In a more contextual measure of deterrence, prosecution is 
said to discredit destabilizing political forces within the nation, and even when those prosecuted retain 
popular support, to limit the long term power of these groups through exclusion from the international 
sphere (Akhavan, 2001).  
The causal problem associated with deterrence is the assumption, firstly, that these potential offenders 
will anticipate the likelihood of apprehension, and once apprehended, next they will expect that stages 
of justice will be swift and certain. That is of course even if these potential offenders hear of the 
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prosecution, know of its details and are not privy to the intensely political variables that weigh on 
selective prosecution.  In addition, they might just be powerful enough, or have powerful enough 
friends, to ignore an ICC warrant. None of these assumptions necessarily hold in the mind of such 
offenders any more than they seem to for offenders of lesser crimes in domestic criminal justice systems 
where apprehension is much more likely and prosecution much less selective. Nevertheless, even if 
direct deterrence is not necessarily effective, some argue that the broader impact of international 
criminal tribunals is to have: 
…“mainstreamed” accountability in international relations and thus instilled long-term 
inhibitions against international crimes in the global community (Akhavan, 2001, p.27). 
Would a rights-protection route add value to the deterrence conundrum? The decisions of the ICJ are 
essentially expressive.  Beyond identifying normative standards that should prevail following judicial 
determination it might be hoped that an ICJ judgement would have some force in dissuading a 
repetition of the behaviour that was the substance of the rejected argument.  But this is no more 
empirically certain than the ICC’s aspiration for an end to impunity through an ICC judgement. 
What might be ascertained in the desire for deterrent impact is that widening the shaming context from 
criminality to rights invasion may shore up a wider community approbation against the behaviour.  
After-all deterrence is as much dependent on the reaction of the community in which the perpetrator 
has presence and status, as it is a pressure on individual conscience.  
Restoration of Peace  
Is it fair to suggest that peace will be a logical outcome when military intervention precedes say the 
involvement of the International Criminal Court or the tribunals in trying to establish individual 
accountability for military conflict which in part challenged peace in the first place? In terms of its 
conflict resolution function, international criminal justice is selective to the extent that only certain 
conflicts are deemed to merit such intervention, and intervention moves from the victors to the 
vanquished.  The Israeli/Palestinian conflict, for instance, is very unlikely to receive global justice 
intervention as part of any middle-east peace package, not because the premium of peace is not critical 
in this context but because the cost involves in judicial intervention for the institutions of rights and 
justice would challenge their hegemonic legitimacy (United Nations Fact-finding Mission on the Gaza 
Conflict).   
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Iinternational criminal justice mechanisms are said to facilitate the restoration of peace and state 
reconstruction, as well as essential community reconstruction post-conflict. The ICC trust fund is 
material evidence of this commitment, limited as it may be. However, the reality is that international 
criminal justice in its formal incarnation is only directed towards protecting geo-politically significant 
transitional states, and against states where such intervention is considered by the UN Security Council 
(UNSC) members to be politically viable. In many areas of global conflict where the states concerned 
have powerful friends, these situations avoid the initiation and consequences of international criminal 
prosecutions.  
The same criticism cannot so consistently be turned on the selective adjudication of the ICJ.  Whether it 
is because this court does not impose determinations of liability, or that it is restricted to declaratory 
judgements, that in exercising its rights protection mandate the court has a more even handed recent 
history in confronting hegemonic political domination.  In addition, it is possible that opening up 
genocide to rights based determinations against state parties may diminish the critical political pre-trial 
determinations of why rather than who to prosecute. 
Perhaps it is in their distance from political expedience that gives the judiciary at large a capacity to 
make accountable through their deliberations the perpetrators of the world’s worst crimes (states or 
individuals).  Once the pressure on prosecutorial discretion is passed, the context of judicial 
determination will be more likely to receive the case on its merits. Judicial deliberation is a sharp 
mechanism for making politicised legal initiation accountable to more balanced adjudication. For the 
purpose of this analysis a further level of accountability open to judges who determine crime and rights 
abuse, is their facility to hold the justice process at all its levels, accountable for the satisfaction of 
legitimate victim interests (Findlay, 2009). 
More than Rights – Accountability through judicial intervention 
Recently Caroline Fournet, while detailing the widest social and political avenues for accountability in 
responding to genocide, and noting the limitations of legality in this regard, chose not to go past the 
importance of legal accountability measures: 
Notwithstanding the evolution on the international scene, legal accountability – prosecutorial 
forms of accountability – remains at the core of the concept: lack of legal accountability means 
impunity, which inevitably ensures the recurrence of the atrocities. As Zolo rightly observes, 
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It can hardly be denied that widespread impunity is a fact and there is an important link – 
though not decisive or exclusive – between the political-judicial restoration of social equilibrium 
and the start of a process of peace-making. 
However, international criminal justice has not yet proven to be capable of remedying 
widespread impunity, except to a minor degree and with normative ambiguities (Fournet, 2011, 
p.97). 
Her inference of a possible judicial-political interface in the accountability mix is also recognition that 
judicial power is critical in calling to book the incipient politicality of international criminal justice, and 
international rights protection. 
As we have done in our earlier case for transforming the international criminal trial into a more 
restorative and responsive justice mechanism (Findlay & Henham, 2005), Fournet argues that by 
augmenting the judicial presence in international justice delivery there is more likely to be greater victim 
satisfaction through the enhanced accountability that judicial determination affords. Such augmentation 
can in the present analysis involve a dual application of responsibility and liability determinations in 
global rights courts and criminal tribunals. Even where non-judicial alternative accountability frames can 
claim a better capacity in creating historical record, judicial determination has a sharper capacity to 
legitimate confidence in the accountability project: 
By its dramaturgy, justice has the power, in the course of the debates, to intensely arise 
consciousness of what has happened, of the horror of the crime itself, (Robert Badinter) 
Chalandon & Nivelle, 1998). As previously mentioned, truth commissions have the immense 
benefit of offering a flexible option particularly ‘suited to  achieving [accountability, 
reconciliation and the transition from an authoritarian past] in countries where limited 
resources, the absence of a strong and impartial legal system, and other circumstances make a 
judicial approach infeasible’ (Abrams & Hayner, 2002). Furthermore, as Havel observes, ‘truth 
commissions (as they are now evolving) have the markedly superior characteristic, rarely 
apparent in criminal trials, of systematic consideration of the victims of the investigated 
oppression (Havel, 2002).’ Still, notwithstanding the advantages offered by TRCs, accountability 
short of prosecutions is bound to fail in achieving its universal goals of prevention and of 
guarantee of non-repetition (Fournet, 2011, pp.40-41).  
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Accountability through judicial deliberation is not a new concept. In fact, one of the arguments in favour 
of a trial model for international criminal justice is that judges can ensure that justice is seen to be done.  
Following on from questioning: 
 the rights focus of aims for international criminal justice 
 the practical attainability of peace and security aims 
 the widening potential for peace and security through crime and rights judicial determinations; 
and  
 the better satisfaction of legitimate victim interests through liability and responsibility 
adjudication frames, 
there is arguably a prescient responsibility for judicial determination of rights in action, so that the aims 
of international criminal justice which claim to advance rights are more than aspirations. 
Conclusion 
It is an important alliance between international criminal law and international human rights law that is 
leading to an enhanced role for judicial determination in the global response to genocide.  An interesting 
and also important bi-product of this is how the judicial manifestation of rights responsibility and 
criminal liability in international legality may be fortified through this alliance, thereby increasing the 
potential of law and legal institutions to respond to global atrocity.  As Groome observes: 
In the ICJ Genocide Judgment-its first judgement enforcing the 1948 Genocide Convention-the 
ICJ has thus created, in effect, a relationship of dependency upon the work of other 
international criminal courts. Given the likelihood that future allegations of genocide will be 
brought not only before the ICJ, but the ICC, the relationship between the ICJ and the ICTY as 
defined by the ICJ Genocide Judgment will also, no doubt, come to define the relationship 
between the ICJ and the ICC. 
We may expect a State Party to initiate a claim of genocide in the ICJ shortly after any such 
alleged conduct takes place and long before any final determination of individual criminal 
responsibility in an international criminal tribunal. The ICJ-dependent upon the work of other 
tribunals-will necessarily have to wait upon their final judgments (Groome, 2007, p.916). 
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Even so, it would be foolish to pin the hopes of genocide victims on judges and trials (determining 
responsibility or liabliity) as an adequate global recourse to the horrors of genocide, and the call to 
accountability which it demands. Despite my assertion that a binary approach in responding to genocide 
(rights and crime) is better managed in the hands of an accountable judiciary and stimulating a 
burgeoning jurisprudence which builds history and legal certainty around atrocity, and reflects the wider 
legitimate victim interests, I would be selling this assertion too hard were it not measured against the 
limits of international legal institutionalism.  Particularly in the context of the atrocity trial Mark 
Drumble rightly sounds caution in the face of overstatement: 
The atrocity trial pins blame on the ugliest and most reprehensible individuals. In reality, 
however, atrocity is the product of many factors. Individual action is one of these. But 
disappeared from the truth-telling process is the involvement (or nonfeasance) of state actors 
and international organisations. Also disappeared is the catalytic role of benefiting bystanders, 
transnational capital and colonial histories. The truths told by international criminal law are 
convenient. They are manageable. By blaming the few for the murder of the many, these truths 
comfort. They do not embarrass too much or too many. But the origin of atrocity is much more 
discomfiting and discomforting. If we move into a mindset where the current truths of 
international criminal law become totalising and exclusionary of all others, then we achieve 
some justice but we actually settle for a very crimped understanding of justice. One of the 
reasons why international criminal law may have limited transformative potential — despite the 
lofty rhetoric — is because it only scratches the surface of what justice actually entails following 
mass atrocity (Drumble, 2009, p.44). 
I have suggested in this brief review that opening up parallel pathways for judicially determining 
genocide, from the perspectives of criminal liability and rights-protection responsibility, builds on a 
present trend in international criminal justice to recognise punishment and protection.  The peace and 
security aims of international criminal justice are compatible with, and may be supported by, this binary 
development of judicial determinations regarding genocide.  However, the global justice aims do not 
offer simple pathways for their attainment, and the consequential aspirations that they protect 
legitimate victims’ rights are far from certain.  Judicial deliberation, therefore, needs to adopt an 
accountability dimension to test whether determinations of responsibility or liability for genocide will 
advance legitimate victim interests if enunciated through a criminal liability or rights responsibility 
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frame.  In so doing, judicial deliberation should bring closer together the enunciation of genocide as a 
global crime and an affront to human rights. 
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